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THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS. By Walter
Wheeler Cook. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942. Pp. x%,
473. $5.00.
THIS volume contains a collection of Cook's articles on the conflict of laws
which have appeared in varied periodicals since 1919. A little more than one-
fifth, represented by Chapters III, VII, IX, XII, XVI-XVIII, consists of
new material. In these chapters Cook deals with "legislative jurisdiction" of
states as used in the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, domicile, renvoi,
the characterization of "things" as "tangible" and "intangible," "movables" and
"immovables," capacity to contract, capacity to marry, and jurisdiction to di-
vorce. A number of the articles previously published contain "Supplementary
Remarks, 1942."
In his introduction to Principles of Private International Law, Professor
Nussbaum calls attention to the fact that the subject of the conflict of laws
has had a fascination for legal scholars in all lands. In this country the sub-
ject has had a special appeal to men like Hohfeld 'and Cook, whose primary
interest was in the fundamental conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning.
Hohfeld's independence of mind made it impossible for him to accept his Har-
vard teaching in the conflict of laws with its underlying theory regarding legis-
lative jurisdiction and foreign created rights. According to Professor Beale,
no state but the one in which the operative facts occurred, and thus the state
which had legislative jurisdiction, could impose a tort liability. In Machado v.
Fontes,1 however, the Court of Appeal of England held a person in damages
for a libel published in Brazil, assumed not to be actionable under Brazilian
law. In his course on the conflict of laws at Yale, Machado v. Foties became
the cornerstone upon which Hohfeld's new "local law theory" of the conflict of
laws was built. Unfortunately for legal scholarship, Hohfeld had only started
his work of developing a new legal analysis in the field of the conflict of laws
when his untimely death took him from our midst, making Cook his literary
executor. Cook had been trained as a mathematical physicist and had kept
abreast with the newer experimental methods of investigation in the natural
sciences as well as with the modern developments in philosophy, psychology
and logic. His ideas in legal philosophy were greatly influenced by John
Dewey, with whom Cook gave a joint seminar on jurisprudence at Columbia.
In 1923, while a member of the faculty of the Yale School of Law, Cook
was asked by the Association of American Law Schools to present his views
on the fundamental legal conceptions concerning the conflict of laws before a
round table of the Association. The remarks there presented were later given
permanent form in an article published in the YALE LAW JOURNAL tinder the
title "The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws," 2 reprinted as
1. [1897] 2 Q. B. 231 (C. A.).
2. (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 457.
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Chapter I in the present volume with the abbreviated title of The Logical Bases
of the Conflict of Laws. In this article and those that followed, Cook devel-
ops Hohfeld's legal conceptions of the conflict of laws along realistic lines
and in the light of the modern scientific method. He starts with Holmes's defi-
nition of law as "the prophecies of what courts 3 will do in fact," which he
accepts as a workable definition from the standpoint of Anglo-American law.
Stressing the necessity of ascertaining what the courts have actually done in-
stead of what they have said, Cook asserts that they have not supported any
of the current theories advanced for the solution of the problems of the con-
flict of laws, such as Story's theory of comity, Dicey's theory of vested rights,
or Beale's theory of territoriality. Cook then concludes that our courts never
enforce foreign law or foreign rights in the conflict of laws, but that they neces-
sarily create their own rights identical with or very similar to those created by
some foreign law. The same view was expressed somewhat earlier by Judge
Learned Hand, who said in Guinness v. Miller 4 : "No court can enforce any
law but that of its own sovereign, and. when a suitor comes to a jurisdiction
foreign to the place of the tort, he can only invoke an obligation recognized
by that sovereign. A foreign sovereign under civilized law imposes an obli-
gation of its own as nearly homologous as possible to that arising in the place
where the tort occurs."
In criticizing the current theories or generalizations in the conflict of laws,
Cook endeavors to show "that the old fundamental axioms are not only inade-
quate, but are not even applied consistently by their advocates; also, that if
they were consistently applied they would often not lead to socially useful
results." Cook admits, of course, that principles and rules are indispensable
and his aim is merely to call attention to their nature and limitations. But he
points out that they cannot be applied automatically and by mere logic to "new"
situations, although they enable us to dispose of the great majority of cases
which are merely routine and do not require thought.
Other writers in this country have taken a realistic approach to the conflict
of laws, but none of them has gone so fully into the logical aspects of the sub-
ject as has Cook. In support of his contention regarding our logical processes
and the approved modern scientific method, Cook refers freely to the writings
of philosophers and scientists, notably to those of John Dewey.
-In the nature of things, much of what Cook has to say is negative. The old
legal structure has to be torn down before a new one can be erected upon more
solid foundations. Fortunately, however, Cook's articles do not stop with de-
structive criticism. He sets forth again and again the positive method that
should be pursued by our courts in a given situation. To illustrate: Some
years ago it was the opinion of the writer of this review that parties should
not be allowed to choose the law governing a contract when its zalidity was
involved, since matters affecting validity rest upon considerations of public
policy which could otherwise be nullified by a simple declaration in the con-
tract that it should be governed by some other law which would validate the
3. At p. 15, Cook suggests that the word "courts" should include some other more or
less similar officials.
4. 291 Fed. 769 (S. D. N. Y. 1923).
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contract. Cook has pointed out that when a contract has a substantial con-
nection with different states or countries, there may be no objection to permit-
.ting the parties to choose their law from the states or countries concerned.
This would seem to be correct, at least when the validity of the contract rests
upon technical considerations rather than upon stringent social and economic
policies. In the field of torts, Cook regards the "last event" doctrine to have
been reached largely "by confused reasoning based upon ambiguous language."
He contends that it might be sensible to allow the plaintiff to select whichever
of the two or more domestic rules involved in the situation is most favorable
to him, a solution adopted by the German courts. As regards Gray v. Gray,5
Cook observes that the question there was one of "capacity" of a wife to sue
her husband, involving considerations of policy concerning domestic relations
which might very well be subject to the law of the domicile of the parties.
Cook's observations regarding the validity of a mortgage by a married woman
to secure her husband's note also deserve serious attention. The law of the
situs is said to govern, but according to Cook the courts should inquire wheth-
er the statute of the situs was intended to cover all conveyances of land in the
state no matter where and by whom the conveyance was executed, for it
might well be that it was not intended to apply to married women domiciled
in other states.
Many other instances might be given where Cook offers helpful suggestions
regarding the formulation of conflict of laws rules. In view of the outstanding
merits of Cook's contribution to the study of the conflict of laws, it would be
ungracious to dwell at length upon the shortcomings of his work in this field.
In his chapter on Domicile, Cook stresses the fact that the verbal symbol
"domicile" has not been given precisely the same meaning by the courts in
matters of taxation, intestate succession, divorce, etc., and properly so, the
courts being influenced by the particular problems before them. Theoretically,
of course, domicile may be given different meanings for different purposes, but
have our courts actually done so? It would be difficult to indicate concrete
instances, with the possible exception of jurisdiction to divorce.
In his treatment of renvoi, Cook adds nothing of a constructive nature. His
statement that the renvoi should neither be rejected nor adopted as a whole
is approved by many conflict of laws students at the present time. The real
problem today is in which situations and in what sense it should be accepted,
and in which situations it should be rejected. Cook has only one suggestion to
offer, namely, that in the matter of distribution of movables upon death, as-
suming uniformity of distribution to be the end in view, the renvoi be rejected
in cases involving a foreign country because uniformity is unlikely and be
accepted in cases involving a sister state because uniformity is likely. This
suggestion is devoid of practical significance, for there is no fundamental dif-
ference in the law of our states concerning the meaning of domicile, nor in the
rule governing the distribution of movables upon death (barring Illinois and
Mississippi), and hence there is little occasion for the application of renvoi.
Nor does Cook's discussion of the characterization problem throw any new
light upon that question. As regards the meaning of domicile Anglo-Ameri-
can courts and most writers are agreed that the term should be defined in ac-
5. 87 N. H. 82, 174 At. 508 (1934).
[Vol. 52
REVIEWS
cordance with the lex ori. Cook objects and says that if uniformity in the dis-
tribution of personal estate upon death is the objective, the meaning given
to domicile by the law of the place of residence cannot be disregarded. In
view of Cook's conclusion that uniformity with foreign countries is probably
impossible, the question is again narrowed to sister states, and as their notions
of domicile are identical, there is little point to the discussion. If, for the sake
of argument, it be assumed that there is a difference in the conception of domi-
cile between the states in question, there is no reason why the lav.- of the place
of residence should be consulted. For example, if the decedent was domiciled
all his life in state X but happened to reside in state Y at the time of his
death, leaving personal property in states X, Y and Z, why should not the
courts of state Z look to the law of state X to determine whether the decedent
had acquired a new domicile in state Y if uniformity is the primary considera-
tion? And what would Cook do if the decedent had a residence in various
states at the time of his death?
Cook's The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws is of excep-
tional importance because it is the first volume in which the method of the
American realistic school and its application to a considerable number of fun-
damental problems is set forth in detail. The same point of view was pre-
sented some years ago by Professor Stumberg in his Principles of the Con-
flict of Laws, but his book was written as a brief textbook for students, cov-
ering the entire field of the conflict of laws, and he ronsequently was unable to
develop as fully and effectively the scientific method underlying the realistic ap-
proach as Cook has done. Cook's views cannot be accepted, of course, by
adherents of the international school who feel that the rules of the conflict of
laws are imposed by international law or at least have some international
basis. Nor can they be approved by members of the nationalist school of
jurists who regard the rules of the conflict of laws as part of the law of each
country and who do not accept Holmes's definition of law. From the stand-
point of Anglo-American law in its present development, however, it wluld
seem that Cook has made out a strong case in favor of the realistic approach.
If it is felt that this approach leads to uncertainty and confusion, the answer
is that in the routine cases courts will apply the existing rules as they have done
heretofore. Only in new situations will they be called upon to determine, in
the light of social and economic ends, whether one of the existing rules
should be applied or a new rule created. Cook admits that taking cognizance
of the social and economic purposes in view may necessitate the breaking up
of larger groupings into smaller ones and the formulation of additional rules
to govern the smaller groups. But this is inevitable in view of the complexity
of modern social and economic life which renders the broader generalizations
inadequate for reaching socially useful decisions. The contention that the
-node of approach advocated by the American realist school is as unproduc-
tive as the theory of vested rights or foreign created rights which it combats,
is not well founded, for it rests either upon a rejection of Holmes's definition
of law or upon a failure to grasp the method so brilliantly set forth in Cook's
The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws.
ERNEST G. LORENZEN f
t Edward J. Phelps Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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CONSTRUCTIVE INCOME TAXATION. By Irving Fisher and Herbert W. Fisher.
New York: Harper & Bros., 1942. Pp. xiv, 277. $3.00.
Constructive Income Taxation is a new book only in the sense that it was
published recently. With the exception of a "legal" section written by Her-
bert W. Fisher, the book contains little more than a lengthy description of a
"proposal for reform" that has long been associated with Professor Irving
Fisher's name, and a presentation of arguments in favor of the proposal that
have already been subjected to intensive critical consideration. To a great
extent, therefore, this review consists of a summary statement of Professor
Fisher's familiar plan and of its alleged advantages, and a restatement of
objections already raised by others.
The purpose of Professor Fisher's plan is the exemption from taxation of
all savings, both corporate and personal. The purpose would be achieved
through the elimination of the present sort of individual income tax as well as
the separate income taxation of corporations, and the imposition of a levy on
individuals assessed in accordance with the amount of their expenditures for
consumption. In support of his proposal, Professor Fisher argues on grounds
of equity. benefits to the economy and the exchequer, and administrative
simplicity.
Professor Fisher has two things to say about the inequity of present taxa-
tion as compared with his proposed spendings tax. He contends, first, that
"income taxation" is a misnomer of the levies that we currently call such be-
cause "true income" is nothing more or less than personal consumption. He
argues, next, that the exemption of savings is the only way of eliminating a
particularly invidious and destructive form of "double taxation" implicit in
our present system.
The second of these contentions rests upon the first; and the first, upon a
definition that is little more than arbitrary.1 If Professor Fisher's definition
of income is accepted, savings are being taxed at least twice, first when earned
and again when their "fruits" (yield) are received. But if something akin to
accretion to economic power is held to be the desirable income concept for
tax purposes, the contention loses its validity. It is true enough that the taxa-
tion of savings results in the imposition of a greater burden than if they were
exempted; the choice, therefore, appears to be not between "single" and
"double" taxation in any abstract sense, but between more and less taxes,2 or
between different sorts of taxation. In any event, a decision for tax policy pur-
poses must be made upon a more pragmatic basis than a recourse to defini-
tions. It seems to the writer that Professor Fisher wisely makes somewhat
less of these particular contentions in the present volume than lie has in years
past and asks rather to be met on the really pertinent issue of the effects of the
adoption of his proposal and their desirability.
1. It should be noted that Professor Fisher is not so grossly guilty of circular rea-
soning in his first argument as may appear to be the case, for the definition of "true in-
come" upon which it rests has long been a friend of his and was originally developed in
connection with theoretical researches that had little to do with income taxation.




The immediate effect of the adoption of his "reform." Professor Fisher tells
us, would be a substantial increase in savings, both because the reward for sav-
ing would be increased (as well as the penalty for spending) and because tax-
payers would be left more money from .which to save after taxes. Greater
savings would mean more investment-an increase in our stock of productive
facilities-and after a time more and cheaper consumer goods. Corporations,
furthermore, freed from the onerous compulsion to distribute their earnings,
could utilize more of them than currently for expansion, development, etc.
Professor Fisher develops a good deal of his argument through the use of an
illustration, "an imaginary case . . . a man named Henry Forward. .. "
Forward is assumed to live in a country that wisely refrains from taxing sav-
ings. Over a forty-year period he manages, by virtue of annual profits at a
forty per cent rate entirely retained in the business, to rise from possession
of a smithy worth $1,000 to sole ownership of an automobile enterprise valued
at about $700,000,000. Professor Fisher points out that if a tax on his annual
profits at a rate as modest as twenty per cent had been imposed, Forward's
growth would have been so stunted that his fortune at the end of the period
would have totaled merely $66,500,COQ. Not only would Forward have been
poorer, but the automobiles produced by the smaller plant would have been an
inferior product and would have cost more than those produced in the larger
one. Professor Fisher holds, furthermore, that the tax revenues would have suf-
fered from the imprudence of the government that imposed the annual tax on
savings. Whereas the twenty per cent tax, collected for forty years, would
have aggregated only $16,600,000, a five per cent death tax imposed at the end
of the forty-year period would have yielded, if no annual tax had been levied,
more than twice this amount. Thus Professor Fisher claims to have estab-
lished the "three-fold advantage" of the exemption of savings-"to the public,
to Mr. Forward, and to Uncle Sam."
If we accept the assumption implicit in the illustration that the growth of
Forward's automobile business was limited to the amounts of profit he plowed
back each year, there can be no argument with Professor Fisher's conclusions.
But if this unrealistic assumption is abandoned, no necessary reason remains
why the enterprise might not have achieved equally vast proportions if an
annual tax had been levied. The difficulties with Professor Fisher's general-
ized argument are even more serious. He is correct, in all likelihood, when
he contends that exemption from taxation would encourage savings. He is by
no means justified, however, in assuming that an increase in savings necessar-
ily leads to an increase in real investment. To say that increased savings will
mean more factories is to say that the volume of savings, if not for the in-
crease, would have effectively imposed a limit on the volume of real invest-
ment, i.e., that every dollar of the smaller amount of savings would have been
invested, and that extra dollars would also have been called for but would
not have been available. It would be difficult for Professor Fisher to demon-
strate that such a situation has prevailed over the past decade; and recent
theoretical analysis of the determinants of the volume of investment renders
his failure to justify this crucial link in his reasoning a serious fault.
Although the issue was raised by Professor Fisher's critics at least
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four years ago,3 he goes no further in the present volume than the identifica-
tion of the problem of the relationship between savings and investment with
Keynesian thought and its dismissal with the statement that the "truth seems
to be not so much that Keynes has influenced economic thought on this sub-
ject on its merits as that he has unwittingly become a convenient instrument
for the rationalization of projects of powerful political interests." 4
If no significant increase in investment resulted from the adoption of Pro-
fessor Fisher's "reform," two of his promised benefits-the benefits to the
public and to Uncle Sam-would fail to materialize. The output of consumer
goods and the yield from death taxes would be no greater than if savings had
not been exempted from taxation. The third of Professor Fisher's triumvirate
-the advantage to Henry Forward-would arise, however. For it is certainly
true that the fortune an individual could accumulate in his lifetime would be
far greater if savings were exempted. Standing thus alone, this "advantage"
seems a dubitable one indeed.
It has already been mentioned that-Professor Fisher envisages both the ad.
ministration of his spendings tax and taxpayer compliance therewith to be a
good deal simpler than is the case with present income taxes. It is true that
the spendings tax would raise less problems in the case of the small number
of taxpayers with sizeable amounts of income from investments, and the elim-
ination of the separate taxation of corporations would of course reduce admin-
istrative problems considerably. In the case of the vast majority of taxpayers,
however, where wages constitute either all or nearly all the income, the spend-
ings tax would almost certainly be less simple than the present income tax,
both for taxpayers and for the Bureau of Internal Revenue.5 Certain problems
unique to a spendings tax would arise at the outset and would soon disappear
(e.g., anticipatory buying and the hoarding of cash prior to its adoption) ; other
difficulties in our present system (e.g., the discrimination in favor of home-
owners relative to renters) would be accentuated under the spendings tax.
It should be noted, furthermore, that the institution of information returns
of an entirely new sort (bank balances, insurance payments, etc.) would in-
crease the complexity of the collection of the revenue, and that none of the
present information requirements could be eliminated to compensate for the
new burden. With low exemptions and a consequently large number of wage-
earner taxpayers, the virtue of relative simplicity would probably not lie with
the spendings tax.
An additional word should be said with respect to the section of the book
entitled "legal" and written by Professor Fisher's brother, Herbert W. Fisher.
A case is argued for the constitutionality of the spendings tax, and the judi-
3. See, e.g., Musgrave, A Further Note on the Double Taxation of Savings (1939)
29 Am. EcoN. REv. 549.
4. Appendix C, p. 229. Professor Fisher responded to Musgrave by writing that
"The idea . . . that 'saving' does not necessarily imply 'investment' is important under cer-
tain circumstances, notably during deflation when there is hoarding or during the New-
Deal hounding of business." See Fisher, Rebuttal to Professor Crum and Mr. Musgrave
(1942) 32 Am. EcoN. REv. 111.
5. See Vickrey, The Spendings Tax in Peace and War (1943) 43 COL. L. REv. 165.
(Vol. 52
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cial history of the income tax is reviewed. It is found that the Sixteenth
Amendment could well encompass "constructive income taxation" and that
the Supreme Court has had a lot of trouble with income taxes over the past
three decades. The reviewer finds these legal considerations no more convinc-
ing a pair of arguments in favor of the exemption of savings from taxation
than he found Professor Irving Fisher's arguments on economic grounds.
CHESTER L. HIRSCH "
THE THEORY OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPM1ENT. By Paul M. Sweezy. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1942. Pp. xiv, 398. $4.00.
AN ESSAY ON IARXIAN ECONOmIcS. By Joan Robinson. London: Macmil-
lan & Co., 1942. Pp. x, 122. 7s. 6d.
THESE are both important books. Their almost simultaneous appearance
creates a significant landmark in the development of economic thinking. The
books and their authors are, however, very different. Dr. Sweezy's book is
much more ambitious; it is the first modem comprehensive and systematic
exposition of Marxian economic theory in the English language. The import-
ance of Mrs. Robinson's essay lies more in its symptomatic nature. It is an
attempt to find common ground between Marxism and the modern heterodoxy
associated particularly with the Keynesian theories of employment. Dr. Sweezy
has for long been known as one of the very few outstanding scholars of
Marxism in the English-speaking world. Mrs. Robinson, though always, and
with some justice, anxious to be regarded as an opponent of orthodoxy, has
nevertheless until recently been a strong critic of Marxism. In their new books,
both authors show a considerable measure of development. Mrs. Robinson's
is more striking. Not so very long ago she could find little of value to the mod-
em economist in Marxism, though her criticism referred not so much to
Marx's own writings (to which she has only recently devoted serious study)
as to the writings of his followers and popularizers. She accused Marx of
sharing the classicist's erroneous belief in the law of the market. She urged
those who were discontented with so-called neo-classical and equilibrium eco-
nomics to seek a positive inspiration in the theories of Keynes. There have
been signs in recent years that she was preparing to reconsider this view. In
a recent reprint in a collection of essays of one of her more critical articles on
Marx, she toned down some of her more extreme statements. She still, how-
ever, refused to face the issues and took refuge in a highly epigrammatic, if arid,
discussion of an epistemological character. However, she must have decided
to pursue the problem, for in a recent article in the Economic Journal she pre-
sented a more penetrating analysis which was quite favorable. She even went
so far as to quote with approval Marx's statement that the ultimate barrier
to capitalist production was capital itself. In the present book, the preface
1 Division of Tax Research, Treasury Department.
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contains an open expression of her belief that modern economists have much
to learn from Marx.
There is also evidence in Dr. Sweezy's book of an intensive re-reading not
only of Marx's own writings but also of the older, little-known literature.
There is evidence, too, that Dr. Sweezy has thought out again the bases of the
economic analyses of Marx, notably the significance of the labor theory of
value. He has clearly not been content to repeat the assertion, which is still
fashionable among many economists who are favorable to Marxism, that an
acceptance of the more advanced conclusions of Marx's theory does not involve
a "belief" in the "discredited" labor theory of value. This book is the result
of a courageous and intensive effort on the author's part, first to understand
most fully and then to expound most clearly.
The structure of Dr. Sweezy's book has been carefully thought out to pre-
sent in the clearest manner Marx's theories from their simplest and most
abstract economic categories to their most complex conclusions concerning
the real world: the present stage of economic development and its political
concomitants. One of the author's most remarkable achievements is that, in
developing an easy expository structure and style, he has avoided the failing,
common to most previous English writers on the subject, of distorting the
theory itself in a schematic and mechanistic direction. One may say that Dr.
Sweezy has managed to preserve the living essence of this dialectic subject
better than one would have thought possible within the limits set by a moder-
ate sized volume dealing with a wide range of problems and by the avowed
aim of serving as a guide to even the least initiated student.
The book is divided into four parts, and the analysis proceeds from the eco-
nomic categories of value and surplus value through the Marxian dynamic
of accumulation and crises to a consideration of monopoly and finance capital-
ism, imperialism, fascism, and war. It is clear from this order and from the
increasing length of the chapters that the author, faithful to Marx himself,
regards the economic theory in the narrow sense as only an instrument. His
interest becomes more intensively engaged as he reaches the problems of the
real world and as the requirement, and possibility, of practical and political
solution becomes more pressing.
After a brief introduction designed to show the inadequacy of orthodox
economics, the book begins with an analysis of Marx's method. Dr. Sweezy
makes good use of Marx's own statements in the Critique of Political Econ-
omy (much neglected by many other expositors) to explain the use of abstrac-
tion with particular reference to the problem of value and the significance of
Marx's formulation of the labor theory of value. It is not possible to recapitu-
late here the proof which Dr. Sweezy gives of the essential need for this abstrac-
tion. What he does show is that the labor theory of value is the basic abstrac-
tion of the social relations in a commodity-producing society. A particularly
successful section of this analysis is the part devoted to Marx's theory of com-
modity fetishism. It is to be hoped that Dr. Sweezy's discovery of "reifica-
tion," a perfectly good English translation of the difficult German word "Vcr-




The two outstanding features of the second section, which deals with the
more dynamic aspects of MTarxian economic theory, are the more extended
treatment and emphasis given to the theory of the industrial reserve army and
the penetrating analysis of the transformation of values into prices. The for-
mer is subsequently used as an important part of the theory of crises. The
latter disposes very successfully of the old and largely exploded notion of the
contradiction between Volumes I and III of Capilal. In this connection
Dr. Sweezy resuscitates a number of very interesting studies of Marx's theory
of prices by Bortkiewicz together with the latter's very interesting critique of
Marx's law of the falling tendency of the rate of profits.
The third section deals with crises and depressions. Dr. Sweezy has evi-
dently been impressed with the difficulty experienced by previous writers in
stating Marx's theory of crises without doing violence to its dialectical com-
plexity. He has, therefore, taken care to state all the elements which go to
make up the Marxian theory, and he has paid special attention to one which,
hitherto usually neglected, provides a significant link with many modem
theories, such as that of Keynes. This aspect of the theory is treated in Chapter
X in which Dr. Sweezy makes excellent use of the material in Volume II
of Capital which deals with what one might call the subordinate market
phenomena of a moving economy, namely, the conditions of preserving a bal-
ance between different brandes of production through the appropriate reali-
zation of their products. The "breakdown" controversy is given another sepa-
rate chapter. Here, as in one or two other parts of the book, the reader is at
first inclined to wonder whether the revival of ancient polemics is not a some-
what pedantic and scholastic pastime. But it soon becomes evident that the
author has not resuscitated the half-forgotten theories of authors whose names
many of his readers have never heard purely because of an antiquarian interest
in his subject, still less to prove his erudition. The conflicting theories which
are here analyzed are still very much alive, even if those with whom they were
originally associated are now little known. These theories live in many dif-
ferent guises, but they have this in common, that it is a matter of considerable
significance in the contemporary political scene whether they are accepted or
rejected. For this reason, Dr. Sweezy's analysis of Rosa Luxemburg and
Kautsky, Tugan-Baranowsky and Henryk Grossmann, should be regarded as
an important stepping-stone to the later discussion of political issues.
In the final part, the author reaches the subject of present-day politics. Here
the author walks on paths which are probably better known to those of his
readers who are not economic specialists. Although this part is more definite
in its attitude and more outspoken in its implied advocacy of a particular po-
litical doctrine, it is, in a sense, less controversial than the rest of the book
because something much more like an all-out adoption or rejection is possible.
The nature of Dr. Sweezy's analysis, on Marxian principles, of present-day
capitalist society is well-known. It begins with a study of the state and its
relation to the economic structure of society. It then proceeds to describe
the growth of monopoly capitalism and the increasing role of finance in mod-
ern economic life and to analyze the significance of this development in terms
of the previously analyzed "laws of motion" of capitalism.
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At this point, the analysis turns to the international field. A consideration
of the growth of imperialism leads to a study of war and fascism and finally
of the present war and of the future of international relations. Here the analy-
sis follows familiar lines, and novelty is to be sought in the exposition rather
than in the argument. In some respects, and in spite of the freshness of the
style, this part of the book is perhaps most open to criticism, not so much in
itself but as it relates to the rest of the book. It is true that a Marxian treatise
such as this must cover not only the economic theory of Marxism, but also
the political analysis and advocacy which is based upon that theory. It is,
nevertheless, extremely difficult to treat both these elements in the same man-
ner. And even Dr. Sweezy in this admirable work has not escaped a certain
dualism. The level of the discussion in the economic chapters is perceptibly
different from that in the later political ones. And the transition from a tech-
nical discussion which at times uses quite intricate mathematics to a fairly
popular expos6 of Marxist doctrine on the current political situation is a little
disconcerting. This, however, is a very minor criticism of a book which is
sure to remain the leader in its field for a long time to come.
Mrs. Robinson, in her essay, is not faced with any such dilemma as must
have confronted Dr. Sweezy. Her book is addressed exclusively to the ex-
pert who must, moreover, be familiar with the latest intricacies of advanced
economic theory if he is to derive the full benefit of a very closely-knit argu-
ment.
Mrs. Robinson begins by acknowledging that there has been an apologetic
strain in academic economics. She then states the Marxian theory of the in-
dustrial reserve army (or of employment) in terms which can be understood
by a modern academic economist. Thereafter she proceeds to discuss the move-
ment of the modern heterodoxy both in the direction of Marx (as regards em-
ployment, monopoly and exploitation) as well as away from him (as regards
the theory of wages). Finally, she enumerates and briefly analyzes what appear
to her to be the unsolved problems still facing those who are prepared to look
upon the present economics ivith critical eyes.
It is impossible to enter here into any of Mrs. Robinson's arguments in
any detail, for it would take at least another essay to analyze the very con-
densed treatment which she gives to her subject. But it may be said that
while Mrs. Robinson now shows a much greater knowledge of Marx, or at
any rate of Capital (which is freely quoted), she has not really understood
Marxism in the way in which Dr. Sweezy has presented that doctrine. Her
essay exemplifies the impossibility of detaching a few elements of Marx's
thought from the whole complex structure. However well Mrs. Robinson
has chosen these elements and however carefully she has analyzed them, there
is still missing an appreciation of the essential unity of Marx's system and
above all of its foundation, the analysis of the contradictory nature of a com-
modity-producing society.
Nevertheless, this book shows freshness of thought, and one may confidently
expect it to be the forerunner of others in which the author will really come
to grips with the problem of the present-day relevance and adequacy of the
theories which she has discussed. ERIc ROLL t
t Professor of Economics, University College, Hull, England.
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CONDITIONS OF PEACE. By Edward Hallett Carr. New York: The Macmil-
lan Co., 1942. Pp. xxiv, 282. $2.50.
PROFESSOR Carr's prescription for peace has alarmed many readers while it
fascinated them. It has alarmed both conservatives and liberals, for it talks in
terms of a revolution against "liberal democracy." But it fascinates by its
penetration and cogency. For this reviewer, there is no other one book which
sheds more light on the European aspects of peace-making. And as one who
calls himself both a liberal and a democrat, I find little with which to quarrel
in Professor Carr's proposals.
The author himself apologizes for having charted his book before the invasion
of Russia and having virtually completed it before Pearl Harbor. To limit
it further, it presents an Englishman's perspective on Germany and western
Europe rather than a world view. It largely ignores the problems of Asia,
India and colonial imperialism, as well as the integration of the Americas in a
new world order. The revolution that has engulfed the world is described with
several important parts missing, notably the rising consciousness of racial
equality in the East, and the end of "white supremacy" brought about by
Japan. Yet Professor Carr has so vivid and fresh a consciousness of other
phases of the world revolution that one can only hope his words will be pon-
dered by those who write the peace.
The revolution, as he sees it, is threefold, being against "liberal democracy,"
against laissez-faire capitalism, and against national self-determination. The
major error of the victors of the last war was neither their vengefulness nor
their liberality, but their belief in the possibility of reviving a world that was
already passing away. The strength of Hitler was his ability to capitalize on
the new trends.
Carr's disposal of "liberal democracy" probably sounds more ominous to
American ears than British. But what he is referring to was the nalve faith
of Wilson that the world could be made safe for democracy by fostering par-
liamentary regimes in all the petty states of Europe. A democracy which
means merely the right to vote on election day is likely to mean little to un-
employed industrial workers or landless peasants. But rather than being
opposed to democracy, Professor Carr demonstrates the need for basing it
on social equality and economic freedom and on a widening participation by
the individual in the administrative process.
In the case of his prophecy of the end of nineteenth century capitalism, like-
wse, he would probably have less opposition in England than in this coun-
try. For devotion to the ideals of laissez-faire and free trade hangs on more
tenaciously in this country than in England. Yet he is perhaps most open to
legitimate criticism for his vague sketch of a new mixed economy of "planned
consumption," taking its cue from our present war economies. He shows
little familiarity with the dominant line of progressive current economic thought
stemming from Keynes.
The third feature of the revolution, as he sees it, is the most convincing,
and it is here that his major contribution lies. For in citing Wilson's empha-
sis on the "self-determination" of nations to be states, he puts his finger on
the error that must above all others not be repeated at the end of World War
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II. And in the final chapters of the book, where he tentatively lays down some
rules for the treatment of Germany and of Europe on a non-national basis, he
is at his most constructive.
He intimates that it would be folly to try to revive the European patchwork
that Hitler destroyed. And to deal with Germany as a national criminal will
only perpetuate and heighten national feeling. The European objective should
be to lessen the force of nationalism by means of a program of relief and re-
construction that minimizes national boundaries. Local authorities should be
encouraged in the administration of the program, and the program as a whole
should be in the name of "Europe" rather than of any nations, conquered or
conquering. The way to destroy the malignant nationalism of which the Nazis
are the most extreme symptom is to make individual Germans feel they
are partners in the "European" enterprise. This is surely enlightened states-
manship. Whether the present governments in exile, victims as they are of
nationalism run wild and thirsting for revenge, will be capable of such states-
manship or whether they will have to be ignored in the long slow process of
peace-making is a question tactfully ignored by Professor Carr.
This book was written as a guide to England's future European policy.
Though schemes for international federation, European or otherwise, are im-
patiently dismissed as too simple, the question of England's relation to future
"European" agencies must be faced, and Professor Carr lays himself open to
the charge of advocating a new kind of Anglo-American imperialism by avoid-
ing it. One might ask, too, why he devotes no attention to the problem of
America's share in the future, beyond emphasizing that we cannot once more
evade responsibility for Europe's peace.
But he has not called his book "The Conditions of Peace," but only "Condi-
tions of Peace". In less than three hundred pages he has packed much wis-
dom without claiming to have solved all the world's problems. If peace were
to come tomorrow, his should be one of the indispensable handbooks in the
briefcase of every American official, no less than of every British official,
charged with bringing order to Europe.
ALFRED M. BINrICAM t
MUNICIPALITIES AND THE LAw IN ACTION 1942. Edited by Charles S.
Rhyne. Washington: National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, 1943.
Pp. 610. $7.50.
THE National Institute of Municipal Law Officers for the last five years
has been making its proceedings available to the public under the above title.
The publication is unusual in that its attitude on every question is completely
predictable. The legal profession has the benefit of the annual reports of the
Section of Insurance Law and the Section of Municipal Law of the American
Bar Association, but these excellent publications are sponsored by groups
comprising both those on the inside looking out and those on the outside look-
ing in. Not so the members of the National Institute of Municipal Law Of-
ficers. They are for the municipality first, last and all the time. Theirs is no
t Editor, Common Sense.
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mere academic interest in the problems of municipal law. Their book is as
different from the ordinary report of the chairman of a bar association com-
mittee on current developments of the law of municipal corporations as the
brief of a lawyer fighting for the economic existence of a client is from a law
review article.
To the 'Municipal Law Officers, right is right and wrong is anything that the
municipalities do not like. Shot through the volume are references to the
infamous case of United States v. City of Nc-o York.1 In 1930, 'Mayor Walker
of the City of New York agreed with the Secretary of the Treasury that
if the United States would turn over the federal building site in City Hall
Park to the City, the City would sell to the United States a court house site in
the civic centre for $2,450,000 and would pay for a new site for the post office
of the same area as the old site. The state legislature authorized the sale of
the civic centre site to the Government "in connection with an agreement be-
tween the city of New York and the United States government for the removal
of the old federal building at the southerly end of City Hall park in the bor-
ough of Manhattan, and the acquisition of a new site in said borough by the
United States government for the construction and erection of a new post-
office building." The civic centre site was thereafter conveyed to the Govern-
ment and the agreed purchase price paid to the City. The new site for the
post office was obtained, and, in 1936, the United States presented a bill to the
City for $4,336,985.79. The then mayor replied to the Secretary of the Treas-
ury expressing surprise and disappointment at hearing that the Government
expected payment for the conveyance of the old post office site to the City.
Nevertheless, the United States brought suit to compel the City to live up to
the other mayor's agreement. judge Clark in the United States district court
held that the City was lawfully obligated to pay, but the National Institute of
Municipal Law Officers spurred to the rescue. The president of the Institute
in his report to the conference spoke with pride of the introduction of the prac-
tice of the Institute's filing briefs ainicus curiae in cases in which all cities are
vitally interested. As an example, he said, "We also filed a brief in the case of
United States v. City of New York in the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit to oppose a district court holding that a mayor
can bind a city by an ordinary letter to a contract liability in excess of five
million dollars in violation of express municipal charter contractual require-
ments." 'Mayor LaGuardia, in addressing the Institute, began by saying, "I
can't even open my remarks by saying, 'The town is yours,' not now, since
the Judge Clark decision in the Post Office case, for if I were to say that, you
could all sue me for specific performance." True, the circuit court of appeals
held that the legislature had, by implication, dispensed with the necessity for
the usual formalities in this case, and the City was held to be bound by the
agreement of its mayor, but the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers
had made its fight for the rights of the municipalities of the United States.
Do not make the mistake of thinking that this polemic attitude detracts from
the value of the book. There is something about a municipality that seems
just about suited to mankind at mankind's present stage of evolution. A coun-
try is too big. It is a byword that a world is beyond the capacities of man.
1. 45 F. Supp. 226 (S. D. N. Y., 1942), 131 F. (2d) 909 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
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Mere size creates a psychic barrier. For some reason, a mind that can deal
with facility in thousands balks at the problem when three extra ciphers are
added and its owner tries to force it to deal in millions. Our city attorneys
deal with no such impossibilities. They really grasp the problems with which
they are dealing. They are not subject to be misled by that delusion, endemic
in nations, that the state is something different from the people. Until we can
develop our brains to the point where we have enough world citizens with the
cosmic grasp of a Churchill or a Madame Chiang Kai-shek, we must rely on
the next best thing, the aggregate wisdom of the men like the authors of
Municipalities and the Law in Action who are running the smaller com-
munities that they know and understand. That instinctive reliance is probably
the basis for the irrepressible heresy in municipal law that the state exists by
sufferance of the towns.
In Mayor LaGuardia's address to one of the sessions of the Municipal Law
Officers, he warned against the "ambition of jurisdiction" of the Federal Gov-
ernment. He expressed the devotion of the selectman to his town thus: "It
is an old principle of law that elected officials must not impair their govern-
ment and must transmit it to their successors without impairment. Therefore,
many times, though we may sympathize with the reasons, we must not permit
encroachment upon the rights of local government. You and I have been tip
against that all of the time in relation to our own state. That is something that
municipal government must protect all of the time as against its own state."
The Mayor pointed out the impossibility of the enforcement of decrees of the
War Labor Board with respect to the wages of municipal employees more
cogently than he has ever been known to sum up the impossibility of the en-
forcement of similar decrees of the unions of the City's transit employees.
Of the seven resolutions which it adopted at its last session, the Institute
directed one against this jurisdiction of the War Labor Board, giving it a
place with the inevitable resolution of thanks to the retiring officers and the
immediately following resolution of appreciation of the leadership of Franklin
D. Roosevelt. Then came resolutions against federal action unreasonably im-
pairing municipal revenues and federal taxation of the interest on municipal
bonds and resolutions in favor of the maintenance of autonomy of local govern-
ments and the extension of federal benefits for injuries sustained by volunteer
civilian defense workers. In other words, the corporation counsel were un-
alterably opposed to federal interference unless it had something to offer.
A committee suggested local ordinances exempting municipalities from lia-
bility arising out of civilian defense activities, but sadly conceded that such
ordinances were of doubtful validity, adding: "If cities could adopt ordinances
and exempt themselves from various liabilities, they would of course include
more activities than those of civilian defense." Nothing could be more typical
of the healthy selfish attitude of municipal government. A state or a nation
might, as the State of New York has done,2 waive all restrictions upon its
liability. And a state court might say, as the New York Appellate Division has
said, that such a waiver eliminates the basis for municipal exemption from
tort liability in governmental activities. 3 But a municipality itself, never.
2. Court of Claims Act, N. Y. Laws 1920, c. 922, § 12a.




While the officers gave their resolution of appreciation of the leadership of
the President the place of honor immediately after the customary resolution
of appreciation of their own officers, they were not quite as respectful to the
President when it came to the discussion of federal taxation of the income
from municipal bonds. The report of the Special Committee on Tax Immuni-
ties is headed "The Attempt to Tax Municipal Bonds-A War Claim Dis-
proved." It states, "The opening gun was fired on January 7, 1942, when the
President in his budget message to Congress urged the taxing of income from
all future issues of State and municipal bonds," and mentions the Presi-
dent's declaration in his Labor Day message that "we must eliminate the tax
exemption of interest on State and local securities and other special privileges
or loopholes in our tax laws." From then on, the story of the gallant fight of
the municipalities continues and at last concludes with a statement that
"the proponents of the tax finally conceded that it would not raise any immedi-
ate war revenues, thus admitting that the issue had been misrepresented as a
war revenue measure by the Treasury Department."
Perhaps the Municipal Law Officers with a little more perspective would
have refrained from criticizing an illogical use of the war as an argument.
Their 1942 meeting was called a "War Conference," and the report of the
Committee on Federal, State and City Relations is published under the caption
"Federal, State and City Relations in Solving War Problems," although among
its discussions it treats the anti-poll tax bill, the exemption of city owned vehi-
cles and boats from the federal use tax, the regulation of employment agencies,
federal control of sizes and weights of motor vehicles, the extension of the
Municipal Bankruptcy Act, and the amenchnent of the Natural Gas Act.
Indeed, the municipalities are a little inclined to be disappointed that the war
is not doing everything that it should for them. The committee just referred
to, under the caption "City-State Relations," laments that "wartime has not
helped cities in their age-old fight to secure home rule and freedom from State
interferences in the conduct of local affairs." There speaks the voice of the
intelligent self-interest on which we must build until all philosophers are kings
and all kings philosophers.
EDWARD J. DimocK
THE SUPERIOR COURT DIARY OF WILLIAM SAMUEL JOHXSOX, 1772-1773.
Edited by John T. Farrell. Washington: The American Historical Asso-
ciation, 1942. Pp. lxv, 293. $7.50.
WILLIAM SAMUEL JOHXSON was a judge of the Superior Court of Con-
necticut during the years 1772-73. For a little more than three months of this
period he kept a diary, or record, of the cases which came before the court.
This diary, the foundation on which Dr. Farrell's book is built, in itself com-
prises only a part of the volume. The entries in the diary are usually brief
and seldom of more than moderate length-they are in the nature of notes
t State Reporter, New York.
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taken by the Judge for his own use, rather than reports of cases for the benefit
of others. To these brief entries the editor has added a mass of valuable sup-
plementary material taken from the records and files of the Superior Court.
This data, now in print for the first time, is at least quite as informative as
the diary itself on the law of the times, is of far greater value to the historian
as a source of general history, and will undoubtedly prove the most interesting
part of the book to persons who are neither lawyers nor historians. In addi-
tion to the diary and the excerpts from the records, there is a well-written
introduction dealing with the court system, the procedure in civil actions,
criminal process, and a sketch of Johnson and his contemporaries. In this
introduction, Dr. Farrell, who is first and foremost an historian, shows a com-
mendable knowledge, on both the technical and the practical side, of colonial
and contemporary English law. His considered judgment is that "this frame-
work of the law in an eighteenth century corporate colony is a picture of the
framework of the law of England at the same time." There were, however,
two actions which Swift in his System of the Laws of Connecticut thought
peculiar to Connecticut alone; one was the action of book debt, and the other
a real action brought for "the surrendry of seisin and possession." Both of
these are discussed by Dr. Farrell in his introduction.
Usually the material from the records and files greatly augments the infor-
mation given in any particular item in the diary. Now and then Johnson's
entry will contain details not apparent from the official record. Thus, in the
case of Smiths v. Russell we learn from the files practically nothing more
than that it was a case of trespass to land involving fishery rights.1 The diary
inserts a number of interesting additional facts. Plaintiff made title to a piece of
land laid out in 1725, bounded on the west by the Connecticut River. Defend-
ant's ancestor was owner of the land on the opposite side of the stream, with
right of fishery. At the time the action was brought, the river, by gradual and
regular yearly change, had moved some eighty rods to the east of where it
had flowed in 1725. The defendants argued that the river, wherever it ran,
was the boundary between them and the plaintiff. The latter claimed that the
eighty-rod strip between the then west bank of the river and the original west
boundary belonged to him. It was held that the plaintiff could come over the
river and follow his old bottom, and that the defendants in fishing on the
eighty-rod strip had committed a trespass. This was clearly a case of alluvion
which the court decided by the rules usually applying to avulsion. The decision
was contrary to English law in general, to the principles of Roman law which
the English law on this particular point seems to have adopted, and to later
Connecticut law.2 The matter of fishing rights is involved in a number of other
cases in this volume-a reminder that in those days the barrel of salted fish
in the farmer's cellar was a welcome addition to his usual winter's fare, and
the right of fishery which enabled him to get it was a right for which he was
willing to fight.
By and large, these cases savor of rural life and an agricultural background.
Even the largest towns were still not big enough to be unaffected by the same
general atmosphere. The smallness of the communities made it more or less
1. P. 32.
2. Cf. Welles v. Bailey, 55 Conn. 292, 10 Ati. 565 (1887).
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inevitable that everyone should come into rather close contact with everyone
else and should know to a large extent everyone else's business. This would
seem to account, in a measure at least, for the numerous actions for slander
which appear on the docket. A good name was not only desirable but neces-
sary for anyone who would maintain any standing of respectability and enjoy
its rewards. Consequently, one's reputation was jealously guarded, and any
slur upon the character of an individual was more likely than in our own time
to give rise to an action at law-not so much for the damages that might be
recovered, we venture to say, as to enable the plaintiff publicly to repudiate
before his neighbors the disreputable things said about him.
One is apt to think of the colonial period as a time when mismated men and
wives bore their lot in a spirit of self-abnegation-a conception of early New
England life which these court records do not substantiate. If we have counted
correctly, in the short three months during which Johnson kept his diary, at
least thirteen divorce cases came up for adjudication. The alleged grounds, in
order of frequency, were adultery, desertion, bigamy (Johnson calls it "Polig-
amy") and cruelty. In his foreword, Judge Clark says that one is struck by
the freshness and modernity of the cases in this hook as a whole. Some of the
divorce cases equal in sordidness anything of a similar nature that modern
journalism delights to peddle to the public today.
Strikingly numerous are the arraignments for counterfeiting. The coun-
terfeiters attempted to imitate both coin ("gold coin commonly called half
Joes," "Spanish Milled Dollars," "Gold Coin of the Kingdom of Portugal
. . . commonly called half Johannes and half Josepus's") and bills of credit
("Bills of Credit of the last New York Emission," "Bills of Credit of the Prov-
ince of New Jersey"). Temptation to counterfeit was doubtless increased by
the high value of the genuine coin; the half Joes were worth forty-eight shill-
ings, and the silver Spanish dollars, six shillings. The face value of the New
York bills is not given, but in the case of the Jersey bills, the counterfeiter,
made one hundred bills in imitation of a fifteen shilling bill, but raised the de-
nomination to twice that amount.3 In one case a defendant was indicted for
uttering counterfeit New York bills after a Connecticut statute had denied
the genuine bills any currency in the colony. The prosecution maintained that
this later statute did not repeal an earlier act which made it a crime to coun-
terfeit "any Bills Emitted by the Province of New York." After much dis-
cussion, the charge against the defendant was quashed; Johnson dissenting,
and the chief justice doubting.
MIany cases, which are of but slight interest to one concerned only with
legal history, contain an abundance of material for the student of social, finan-
cial or cultural history. Thus for the lawyer, Clark v. Kinncy is a simple
routine case, hinging on whether a carrier was guilty of negligence in losing
plaintiff's goods. 4 For the student of New England colonial history, the official
report of the case, with its many depositions, is a document rich in historical
information. Late in February, 1772, two teams, one of which belonged to
Kinney, left Boston for Pomfret, their carts loaded with "West India English
goods," which in Kinney's load included at least one hogshead of rum. He
3. Pp: 43, 61, 68, 97, 203, 222.
4. Pp. 193-96.
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also was carrying two barrels of brown sugar (489 lbs.), and a sixteen pound
loaf of white sugar, said sugars being consigned to Clark at Pomfret. By
night of the second day the teams had reached Mendon, Massachusetts. At a
certain brook in that town, Kinney, instead of using a passable ford, attempted
in the darkness to drive his team over a bridge which was in none too good a
state of repair. One of his wheels failed to hit the planking of the bridge, and
the cart and its contents were thrown into the stream and the sugars destroyed.
Apparently the colonial roads were not too bad to allow cartage over long dis-
tances even in the worst part of winter and at a fairly good rate of travel. In
this instance at least, Boston, rather than some town in Connecticut on Long
Island Sound, was the port of entry for West India goods that found their way
into northeastern Connecticut. If we may judge from the figures given for
the brown sugar (5.52 pence per pound wholesale in Boston, with 36/100 of
a penny per pound asked by the carter for carriage to Pomfret), the price of
these goods in inland communities could hardly be attributed to the cost of
overland freight.
India goods are again mentioned in the case of a burglar who broke into the
store of a Danbury merchant, said to have constantly kept on hand a large
quantity of "English and India Goods Wares and Merchandize." The bur-
glar on conviction was sentenced to be branded on his forehead with "the Capi-
tal Litter B on a hot Iron and have one of his ears Nailed to a post and Cut
off and also Whipt on his Naked body fifteen Stripes." 5 Branding, which seems
to have been given a fresh impetus in Elizabeth's reign, was fairly common in
both Connecticut and Massachusetts in colonial times. Nailing the culprit's
ear to a post probably originated in English local law and custom." The men-
tion of "earnest money" to bind an agreement to sell five pieces of land, re-
calls another old custom that was common in England and the law merchant
at least as early as the twelfth century.7
A number of references to negro slaves are reminiscent of the fact that in the
colonial period the holding of slaves in Connecticut was not only legal but
countenanced by public opinion. The difficulty of making the institution of
slavery fit into the habits and customs of New England life, as well as the pos-
sible inconvenience of slaveholding to a master in this northern colony, is
shown by a very interesting case concerning the manumission of a slave who
was clearly of more trouble than use to his alleged owner.8
His latest biographer has said that at twenty Johnson was "a classical schol-
ar of standing"-which makes one wonder if at double that age he could have




6. A local law of Portsmouth, the original from about 1272, reads: "Also if there
be any small pikers that is under the valur of xii d. ob. his ere to be nayled to the pelery,
he to chese whether he woll kytt or tere it of". 1 BATESON, BOROUGH CvsTo as (Seld.
Soc. ed., v. 18, 1904-06). There were various other local laws having to do with the nail-
ing or cutting off of ears. Id. at 56-57.
7. P. 114.
8. Pp. 182-93.
9. Pp. ix, 245.
'I George Burton Adams Professor of History, Yale University.
[Vol. 52
